Maskin's Theorem with limited veto power

Jean Pierre Benoît; Efe A. Ok

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2005.03.008

Maskin's Theorem with limited veto power

Jean Pierre Benoît, Efe A. Ok

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We weaken the no-veto power condition of Maskin [Maskin, E.,1999. Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality. Rev. Econ. Stud. 66, 23-38] to limited veto power, and prove that any monotonic social choice rule is Nash implementable if it satisfies this weaker condition. The result is obtained by using the canonical Maskin mechanism without modification. An immediate corollary is that the weak core is Nash implementable in any coalitional game environment. An example is given to show that the strong core need not be implementable, even when it is monotonic.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	331-339
Number of pages	9
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	55
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.03.008
State	Published - May 2006

Keywords

Core
Implementation
No-veto power

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

Access to Document

10.1016/j.geb.2005.03.008

Cite this

@article{c9d81a640af042488751a5591f7da47d,

title = "Maskin's Theorem with limited veto power",

abstract = "We weaken the no-veto power condition of Maskin [Maskin, E.,1999. Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality. Rev. Econ. Stud. 66, 23-38] to limited veto power, and prove that any monotonic social choice rule is Nash implementable if it satisfies this weaker condition. The result is obtained by using the canonical Maskin mechanism without modification. An immediate corollary is that the weak core is Nash implementable in any coalitional game environment. An example is given to show that the strong core need not be implementable, even when it is monotonic.",

keywords = "Core, Implementation, No-veto power",

author = "Beno{\^i}t, {Jean Pierre} and Ok, {Efe A.}",

year = "2006",

month = may,

doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2005.03.008",

language = "English (US)",

volume = "55",

pages = "331--339",

journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",

issn = "0899-8256",

publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",

number = "2",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Maskin's Theorem with limited veto power

AU - Benoît, Jean Pierre

AU - Ok, Efe A.

PY - 2006/5

Y1 - 2006/5

N2 - We weaken the no-veto power condition of Maskin [Maskin, E.,1999. Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality. Rev. Econ. Stud. 66, 23-38] to limited veto power, and prove that any monotonic social choice rule is Nash implementable if it satisfies this weaker condition. The result is obtained by using the canonical Maskin mechanism without modification. An immediate corollary is that the weak core is Nash implementable in any coalitional game environment. An example is given to show that the strong core need not be implementable, even when it is monotonic.

AB - We weaken the no-veto power condition of Maskin [Maskin, E.,1999. Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality. Rev. Econ. Stud. 66, 23-38] to limited veto power, and prove that any monotonic social choice rule is Nash implementable if it satisfies this weaker condition. The result is obtained by using the canonical Maskin mechanism without modification. An immediate corollary is that the weak core is Nash implementable in any coalitional game environment. An example is given to show that the strong core need not be implementable, even when it is monotonic.

KW - Core

KW - Implementation

KW - No-veto power

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=33645932318&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=33645932318&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2005.03.008

DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2005.03.008

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:33645932318

SN - 0899-8256

VL - 55

SP - 331

EP - 339

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

IS - 2

ER -

Maskin's Theorem with limited veto power

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this