Maskin's Theorem with limited veto power

Jean Pierre Benoît, Efe A. Ok

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


    We weaken the no-veto power condition of Maskin [Maskin, E.,1999. Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality. Rev. Econ. Stud. 66, 23-38] to limited veto power, and prove that any monotonic social choice rule is Nash implementable if it satisfies this weaker condition. The result is obtained by using the canonical Maskin mechanism without modification. An immediate corollary is that the weak core is Nash implementable in any coalitional game environment. An example is given to show that the strong core need not be implementable, even when it is monotonic.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)331-339
    Number of pages9
    JournalGames and Economic Behavior
    Issue number2
    StatePublished - May 2006


    • Core
    • Implementation
    • No-veto power

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Finance
    • Economics and Econometrics


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