Matching and chatting: An experimental study of the impact of network communication on school-matching mechanisms

Tingting Ding; Andrew Schotter

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2016.02.004

Matching and chatting: An experimental study of the impact of network communication on school-matching mechanisms

Tingting Ding, Andrew Schotter

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

While, in theory, the school matching problem is a static non-cooperative one-shot game, in reality the “matching game” is played by parents who choose their strategies after consulting or chatting with other parents in their social networks. In this paper we compare the performance of the Boston and the Gale–Shapley mechanisms in the presence of chatting through social networks. Our results indicate that allowing subjects to chat has an important impact on the likelihood that subjects change their strategies and also on the welfare and stability of the outcomes determined by the mechanism.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	94-115
Number of pages	22
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	103
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.02.004
State	Published - May 2017

Keywords

Chat
Matching
Mechanism design
Networks
School choice

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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