@article{71a87e8d7a83499aa4b0d01f226ad92c,
title = "Matching and chatting: An experimental study of the impact of network communication on school-matching mechanisms",
abstract = "While, in theory, the school matching problem is a static non-cooperative one-shot game, in reality the “matching game” is played by parents who choose their strategies after consulting or chatting with other parents in their social networks. In this paper we compare the performance of the Boston and the Gale–Shapley mechanisms in the presence of chatting through social networks. Our results indicate that allowing subjects to chat has an important impact on the likelihood that subjects change their strategies and also on the welfare and stability of the outcomes determined by the mechanism.",
keywords = "Chat, Matching, Mechanism design, Networks, School choice",
author = "Tingting Ding and Andrew Schotter",
note = "Funding Information: Support for this research was funded by the National Science Foundation grant number 1123045. We would like to thank the Associate Editor, anonymous referees, Tayfun S?nmez, Leeat Yariv and Tim Salmon for their valuable comments, and thank the participants of the 2012 International ESA Conference, the 2013 North American ESA Conference, the University of Texas at Dallas Economics seminar, and the Santa Barbara Conference on Behavioral Economics for helpful discussion. We would also like to thank the Center for Experimental Social Science at New York University for their lab support as well as Anwar Ruff for his programming assistance. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2016 Elsevier Inc.",
year = "2017",
month = may,
doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2016.02.004",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "103",
pages = "94--115",
journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",
issn = "0899-8256",
publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",
}