Andrea Mattozzi, Antonio Merlo

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


    We study the recruitment of individuals in the political sector. We propose an equilibrium model of political recruitment by two political parties competing in an election. We show that political parties may deliberately choose to recruit only mediocre politicians, in spite of the fact that they could select better individuals. Furthermore, we show that when political talent is scarce this phenomenon is more likely to occur in proportional than in majoritarian electoral systems.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)32-44
    Number of pages13
    JournalJournal of Public Economics
    StatePublished - Oct 1 2015


    • Electoral systems
    • Parties
    • Political recruitment
    • Politicians

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Finance
    • Economics and Econometrics


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