Mediocracy

Andrea Mattozzi; Antonio Merlo

doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.07.001

Mediocracy

Andrea Mattozzi, Antonio Merlo

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We study the recruitment of individuals in the political sector. We propose an equilibrium model of political recruitment by two political parties competing in an election. We show that political parties may deliberately choose to recruit only mediocre politicians, in spite of the fact that they could select better individuals. Furthermore, we show that when political talent is scarce this phenomenon is more likely to occur in proportional than in majoritarian electoral systems.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	32-44
Number of pages	13
Journal	Journal of Public Economics
Volume	130
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.07.001
State	Published - Oct 1 2015

Keywords

Electoral systems
Parties
Political recruitment
Politicians

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.07.001

Cite this

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title = "Mediocracy",

abstract = "We study the recruitment of individuals in the political sector. We propose an equilibrium model of political recruitment by two political parties competing in an election. We show that political parties may deliberately choose to recruit only mediocre politicians, in spite of the fact that they could select better individuals. Furthermore, we show that when political talent is scarce this phenomenon is more likely to occur in proportional than in majoritarian electoral systems.",

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author = "Andrea Mattozzi and Antonio Merlo",

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AB - We study the recruitment of individuals in the political sector. We propose an equilibrium model of political recruitment by two political parties competing in an election. We show that political parties may deliberately choose to recruit only mediocre politicians, in spite of the fact that they could select better individuals. Furthermore, we show that when political talent is scarce this phenomenon is more likely to occur in proportional than in majoritarian electoral systems.

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KW - Parties

KW - Political recruitment

KW - Politicians

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Mediocracy

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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