TY - GEN
T1 - Microfluidic Trojan Design in Flow-based Biochips
AU - Shayan, Mohammed
AU - Bhattacharjee, Sukanta
AU - Song, Yong Ak
AU - Chakrabarty, Krishnendu
AU - Karri, Ramesk
N1 - Funding Information:
This research is supported in part by the Army Research Office under grant number W911NF-17-1-0320, NSF Award numbers CNS-1526405, CNS-1833622 and CNS-1833624, NYU Center for Cyber Security (CCS), and CCS-Abu Dhabi.
PY - 2020/3
Y1 - 2020/3
N2 - Microfluidic technologies find application in various safety-critical fields such as medical diagnostics, drug research, and cell analysis. Recent work has focused on security threats to microfluidic-based cyberphysical systems and defenses. So far the threat analysis has been limited to the cases of tampering with control software/hardware, which is common to most cyberphysical control systems in general; in a sense, such an approach is not exclusive to microfluidics. In this paper, we present a stealthy attack paradigm that uses characteristics exclusive to the microfluidic devices - a microfluidic trojan. The proposed trojan payload is a valve whose height has been perturbed to vary its pressure response. This trojan can be triggered in multiple ways based on time or specific operations. These triggers can occur naturally in a bioassay or added into the controlling software. We showcase the trojan application in carrying out practical attacks -contamination, parameter-tampering and denial-of-service - on a real-life bioassay implementation. Further, we present guidelines to launch stealthy attacks and to counter them.
AB - Microfluidic technologies find application in various safety-critical fields such as medical diagnostics, drug research, and cell analysis. Recent work has focused on security threats to microfluidic-based cyberphysical systems and defenses. So far the threat analysis has been limited to the cases of tampering with control software/hardware, which is common to most cyberphysical control systems in general; in a sense, such an approach is not exclusive to microfluidics. In this paper, we present a stealthy attack paradigm that uses characteristics exclusive to the microfluidic devices - a microfluidic trojan. The proposed trojan payload is a valve whose height has been perturbed to vary its pressure response. This trojan can be triggered in multiple ways based on time or specific operations. These triggers can occur naturally in a bioassay or added into the controlling software. We showcase the trojan application in carrying out practical attacks -contamination, parameter-tampering and denial-of-service - on a real-life bioassay implementation. Further, we present guidelines to launch stealthy attacks and to counter them.
KW - fluid flow
KW - microfluidic
KW - security
KW - trojans
KW - valves
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85087414825&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85087414825&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.23919/DATE48585.2020.9116225
DO - 10.23919/DATE48585.2020.9116225
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85087414825
T3 - Proceedings of the 2020 Design, Automation and Test in Europe Conference and Exhibition, DATE 2020
SP - 1037
EP - 1042
BT - Proceedings of the 2020 Design, Automation and Test in Europe Conference and Exhibition, DATE 2020
A2 - Di Natale, Giorgio
A2 - Bolchini, Cristiana
A2 - Vatajelu, Elena-Ioana
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
T2 - 2020 Design, Automation and Test in Europe Conference and Exhibition, DATE 2020
Y2 - 9 March 2020 through 13 March 2020
ER -