Mixed motives in the equilibrium view of joint intention

Nicholas Almendares, Dimitri Landa

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


    We develop a theory of joint intention in contexts in which participants have mixed motives that can manifest in all-things-considered reasons to deviate from contributing to the desired project, e.g., contexts with collective action problems. Our theory is based on strategic equilibrium-based reasoning, which links the characterization of joint intention in terms of individual intentions with conditions on strategy profiles of the underlying strategic games. We use elements of equilibrium reasoning to construct a counterfactual account of joint intention in the mixed-motive contexts, which extends the reach of the notion of joint intention considerably beyond that of previous formulations.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)733-755
    Number of pages23
    JournalPhilosophical Studies
    Issue number3
    StatePublished - Mar 1 2016


    • Collective action problems
    • Coordination
    • Equilibrium
    • Joint intention

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Philosophy


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