Model-Measurement Data Integrity Attacks

Gang Cheng, Yuzhang Lin, Jun Yan, Junbo Zhao, Linquan Bai

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


The vulnerabilities of information and communication technology (ICT) infrastructures leave room for cyber attacks threatening the reliable operations of power systems. Based on the real-world evidence of the Ukraine power grid attack and the popular technical discussion that cyber attacks could be launched at the control-center level, this paper reveals a new attack strategy: model-measurement data integrity (MMI) attack. Instead of compromising measurements only, we investigate the possibility where network parameters are coordinately manipulated when constructing false data injection attack (FDIA) vectors. Furthermore, we model cyber adversaries' possible behavior of co-planning the manipulated measurement channels and parameter attack vectors prior to the launch of FDIAs. The revealed MMI attack strategy allows a drastic reduction of measurement channels to compromise in run-time for keeping the stealth property. Simulations in the IEEE 14-bus test system and the IEEE 118-bus test system demonstrate the feasibility of the revealed MMI attack strategy.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)4741-4757
Number of pages17
JournalIEEE Transactions on Smart Grid
Issue number6
StatePublished - Nov 1 2023


  • Cyber security
  • false data injection attack
  • network parameter
  • optimization
  • power system modeling
  • state estimation

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • General Computer Science


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