Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent

Arjada Bardhi, Yingni Guo

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


    A fully committed sender seeks to sway a collective adoption decision through designing experiments. Voters have correlated payoff states and heterogeneous thresholds of doubt. We characterize the sender-optimal policy under unanimity rule for two persuasion modes. Under general persuasion, evidence presented to each voter depends on all voters' states. The sender makes the most demanding voters indifferent between decisions, while the more lenient voters strictly benefit from persuasion. Under individual persuasion, evidence presented to each voter depends only on her state. The sender designates a subgroup of rubber-stampers, another of fully informed voters, and a third of partially informed voters. The most demanding voters are strategically accorded high-quality information.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)1111-1149
    Number of pages39
    JournalTheoretical Economics
    Issue number3
    StatePublished - Sep 2018


    • D71
    • D82
    • D83
    • G28
    • Information design
    • K20
    • O32
    • collective decision-making
    • information guard
    • unanimity rule

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • General Economics, Econometrics and Finance


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