Monotone games with positive spillovers

Douglas Gale

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


    A monotone game comprises the infinitely repeated play of an n-person stage game, subject to the constraint that players' actions be monotonically nondecreasing over time. These games represent a variety of strategic situations in which players are able to make (partial) commitments. If the stage games have positive spillovers and satisfy certain other conditions, then the limit points of the subgame perfect equilibria are precisely the approachable action profiles. This characterization is applied to voluntary contribution games, market games, and coordination games. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C7.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)295-320
    Number of pages26
    JournalGames and Economic Behavior
    Issue number2
    StatePublished - 2001


    • Coordination games
    • Efficiency
    • Market games
    • Monotone games
    • Positive spillovers
    • Subgame perfect equilibrium
    • Voluntary contribution games

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Finance
    • Economics and Econometrics


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