Monotone games with positive spillovers

Douglas Gale

doi:10.1006/game.2000.0842

Monotone games with positive spillovers

Douglas Gale

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

A monotone game comprises the infinitely repeated play of an n-person stage game, subject to the constraint that players' actions be monotonically nondecreasing over time. These games represent a variety of strategic situations in which players are able to make (partial) commitments. If the stage games have positive spillovers and satisfy certain other conditions, then the limit points of the subgame perfect equilibria are precisely the approachable action profiles. This characterization is applied to voluntary contribution games, market games, and coordination games. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C7.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	295-320
Number of pages	26
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	37
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1006/game.2000.0842
State	Published - 2001

Keywords

Coordination games
Efficiency
Market games
Monotone games
Positive spillovers
Subgame perfect equilibrium
Voluntary contribution games

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1006/game.2000.0842

Cite this

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title = "Monotone games with positive spillovers",

abstract = "A monotone game comprises the infinitely repeated play of an n-person stage game, subject to the constraint that players' actions be monotonically nondecreasing over time. These games represent a variety of strategic situations in which players are able to make (partial) commitments. If the stage games have positive spillovers and satisfy certain other conditions, then the limit points of the subgame perfect equilibria are precisely the approachable action profiles. This characterization is applied to voluntary contribution games, market games, and coordination games. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C7.",

keywords = "Coordination games, Efficiency, Market games, Monotone games, Positive spillovers, Subgame perfect equilibrium, Voluntary contribution games",

author = "Douglas Gale",

note = "Funding Information: 1Earlier versions of this paper were presented in seminars at New York University and the London School of Economics and at the Northwestern University Summer Workshop (Microeconomics Week), where participants made many useful comments. I am particularly indebted to Bob Rosenthal for reading the paper and to Steven Matthews for pointing out the connections with his own work. The financial support of the National Science Foundation, under grants SBR 9422194 and SBR 9810912, and the C. V. Starr Center for Applied Economics at NYU are gratefully acknowledged.",

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PY - 2001

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N2 - A monotone game comprises the infinitely repeated play of an n-person stage game, subject to the constraint that players' actions be monotonically nondecreasing over time. These games represent a variety of strategic situations in which players are able to make (partial) commitments. If the stage games have positive spillovers and satisfy certain other conditions, then the limit points of the subgame perfect equilibria are precisely the approachable action profiles. This characterization is applied to voluntary contribution games, market games, and coordination games. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C7.

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KW - Coordination games

KW - Efficiency

KW - Market games

KW - Monotone games

KW - Positive spillovers

KW - Subgame perfect equilibrium

KW - Voluntary contribution games

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Monotone games with positive spillovers

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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