TY - JOUR
T1 - Moral “foundations” as the product of motivated social cognition
T2 - Empathy and other psychological underpinnings of ideological divergence in “individualizing” and “binding” concerns
AU - Strupp-Levitsky, Michael
AU - Noorbaloochi, Sharareh
AU - Shipley, Andrew
AU - Jost, John T.
N1 - Funding Information:
Funding: This article is based in part on an undergraduate honors thesis submitted by the first author to the Department of Psychology of New York University (NYU) under the academic supervision of the fourth author. The research was funded by the Dean’s Undergraduate Research Fund at NYU. There was no grant number associated with the award. The funders had no role in study design, data collection or analysis,decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 Strupp-Levitsky et al. This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
PY - 2020/11
Y1 - 2020/11
N2 - According to moral foundations theory, there are five distinct sources of moral intuition on which political liberals and conservatives differ. The present research program seeks to contextualize this taxonomy within the broader research literature on political ideology as motivated social cognition, including the observation that conservative judgments often serve system-justifying functions. In two studies, a combination of regression and path modeling techniques were used to explore the motivational underpinnings of ideological differences in moral intuitions. Consistent with our integrative model, the “binding” foundations (in-group loyalty, respect for authority, and purity) were associated with epistemic and existential needs to reduce uncertainty and threat and system justification tendencies, whereas the so-called “individualizing” foundations (fairness and avoidance of harm) were generally unrelated to epistemic and existential motives and were instead linked to empathic motivation. Taken as a whole, these results are consistent with the position taken by Hatemi, Crabtree, and Smith that moral “foundations” are themselves the product of motivated social cognition.
AB - According to moral foundations theory, there are five distinct sources of moral intuition on which political liberals and conservatives differ. The present research program seeks to contextualize this taxonomy within the broader research literature on political ideology as motivated social cognition, including the observation that conservative judgments often serve system-justifying functions. In two studies, a combination of regression and path modeling techniques were used to explore the motivational underpinnings of ideological differences in moral intuitions. Consistent with our integrative model, the “binding” foundations (in-group loyalty, respect for authority, and purity) were associated with epistemic and existential needs to reduce uncertainty and threat and system justification tendencies, whereas the so-called “individualizing” foundations (fairness and avoidance of harm) were generally unrelated to epistemic and existential motives and were instead linked to empathic motivation. Taken as a whole, these results are consistent with the position taken by Hatemi, Crabtree, and Smith that moral “foundations” are themselves the product of motivated social cognition.
KW - Adolescent
KW - Empathy/physiology
KW - Female
KW - Group Processes
KW - Humans
KW - Intuition/physiology
KW - Judgment/physiology
KW - Male
KW - Morals
KW - Motivation/physiology
KW - Politics
KW - Social Cognition
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U2 - 10.1371/journal.pone.0241144
DO - 10.1371/journal.pone.0241144
M3 - Article
C2 - 33170885
AN - SCOPUS:85096029912
SN - 1932-6203
VL - 15
JO - PloS one
JF - PloS one
IS - 11
M1 - e0241144
ER -