Most games violate the common priors doctrine

Yaw Nyarko

doi:10.1111/j.1742-7363.2009.00129.x

Most games violate the common priors doctrine

Yaw Nyarko

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

The type of a player in a game describes the beliefs of that player about the types of others. We show that the subset of vectors of such player-type beliefs which obey the consistency condition sometimes called the Harsanyi doctrine is of Lebesgue measure zero. Furthermore, as the number of players becomes large the ratio of the dimension Harsanyi-consistent beliefs to the set of all beliefs tends to zero.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	189-194
Number of pages	6
Journal	International Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	6
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1742-7363.2009.00129.x
State	Published - 2010

Keywords

Bayesian games
Common priors
Harsanyi doctrine
Prior beliefs
Types

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1111/j.1742-7363.2009.00129.x

Cite this

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Most games violate the common priors doctrine

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

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