Motives and implementation: On the design of mechanisms to elicit opinions

Jacob Glazer, Ariel Rubinstein

    Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

    Abstract

    A number of experts receive noisy signals regarding a desirable public decision. The public target is to make the best possible decision on the basis of all the information available to the experts. We compare two “cultures”: In the first, the experts are driven only by the public motive to choose the most desirable action. In the second, each expert is also driven by a private motive: to have his recommendation accepted. We show that in the first culture, every mechanism will have an equilibrium which does not achieve the public target, whereas the second culture gives rise to a mechanism whose unique equilibrium outcome does achieve the public target.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Title of host publicationModels Of Bounded Rationality And Mechanism Design
    PublisherWorld Scientific Publishing Co.
    Pages13-29
    Number of pages17
    ISBN (Electronic)9789813141339
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Jan 1 2016

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)
    • General Business, Management and Accounting

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