TY - JOUR
T1 - MUDDLE
T2 - Multi-Modal Dynamic Detector Loopback Evaluator to Expose Trojans in Zero-Trust PCB Systems
AU - Krishnamurthy, Prashanth
AU - Pearce, Hammond
AU - Surabhi, Virinchi Roy
AU - Trujillo, Joshua
AU - Karri, Ramesh
AU - Khorrami, Farshad
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 1981-2012 IEEE.
PY - 2024
Y1 - 2024
N2 - We propose the MUDDLE framework for hardware Trojan detection in Printed Circuit Boards (PCBs) in a golden-free and zero-trust setting (unavailable known-good PCB, measurements from processors on the PCB are not trustworthy). Trojans could be inserted by adversaries during/after manufacturing to impact safety, stability, and performance of cyber-physical systems (CPS). MUDDLE monitors side channels under defender-controlled software-driven excitations and I/O connections to create loopbacks. Side channel measurements are acquired by an external test rig that is configurable (using an FPGA). Using FPGA-based reconfigurable logic, the defender instantiates active dynamic loopbacks crafted to illuminate Trojans. Side channel time series are evaluated against models constructed from golden-free design-based characterizations to probabilistically detect Trojans. We demonstrate efficacy of MUDDLE on a reconfigurable PCB Trojan testbed (built atop the OpenPLC programmable logic controller (PLC) platform) combined with an external configurable test rig.
AB - We propose the MUDDLE framework for hardware Trojan detection in Printed Circuit Boards (PCBs) in a golden-free and zero-trust setting (unavailable known-good PCB, measurements from processors on the PCB are not trustworthy). Trojans could be inserted by adversaries during/after manufacturing to impact safety, stability, and performance of cyber-physical systems (CPS). MUDDLE monitors side channels under defender-controlled software-driven excitations and I/O connections to create loopbacks. Side channel measurements are acquired by an external test rig that is configurable (using an FPGA). Using FPGA-based reconfigurable logic, the defender instantiates active dynamic loopbacks crafted to illuminate Trojans. Side channel time series are evaluated against models constructed from golden-free design-based characterizations to probabilistically detect Trojans. We demonstrate efficacy of MUDDLE on a reconfigurable PCB Trojan testbed (built atop the OpenPLC programmable logic controller (PLC) platform) combined with an external configurable test rig.
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U2 - 10.1109/MM.2024.3520996
DO - 10.1109/MM.2024.3520996
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85213549175
SN - 0272-1732
JO - IEEE Micro
JF - IEEE Micro
ER -