TY - GEN
T1 - Multi-receiver GPS spoofing detection
T2 - 32nd Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, ACSAC 2016
AU - Jansen, Kai
AU - Tippenhauer, Nils Ole
AU - Pöpper, Christina
N1 - Copyright:
Copyright 2017 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2016/12/5
Y1 - 2016/12/5
N2 - Spoofing is a serious threat to the widespread use of Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSSs) such as GPS and can be expected to play an important role in the security of many future IoT systems that rely on time, location, or navigation information. In this paper, we focus on the technique of multi-receiver GPS spoofing detection, so far only proposed theoretically. This technique promises to detect malicious spoofing signals by making use of the reported positions of several GPS receivers deployed in a fixed constellation. We scrutinize the assumptions of prior work, in particular the error models, and investigate how these models and their results can be improved due to the correlation of errors at co-located receiver positions. We show that by leveraging spatial noise correlations, the false acceptance rate of the countermeasure can be improved while preserving the sensitivity to attacks. As a result, receivers can be placed significantly closer together than previously expected, which broadens the applicability of the countermeasure. Based on theoretical and practical investigations, we build the first realization of a multi-receiver countermeasure and experimentally evaluate its performance both in authentic and in spoofing scenarios.
AB - Spoofing is a serious threat to the widespread use of Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSSs) such as GPS and can be expected to play an important role in the security of many future IoT systems that rely on time, location, or navigation information. In this paper, we focus on the technique of multi-receiver GPS spoofing detection, so far only proposed theoretically. This technique promises to detect malicious spoofing signals by making use of the reported positions of several GPS receivers deployed in a fixed constellation. We scrutinize the assumptions of prior work, in particular the error models, and investigate how these models and their results can be improved due to the correlation of errors at co-located receiver positions. We show that by leveraging spatial noise correlations, the false acceptance rate of the countermeasure can be improved while preserving the sensitivity to attacks. As a result, receivers can be placed significantly closer together than previously expected, which broadens the applicability of the countermeasure. Based on theoretical and practical investigations, we build the first realization of a multi-receiver countermeasure and experimentally evaluate its performance both in authentic and in spoofing scenarios.
KW - Countermeasure
KW - GPS
KW - Localization security
KW - Spoofing
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85007597187&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85007597187&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1145/2991079.2991092
DO - 10.1145/2991079.2991092
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85007597187
T3 - ACM International Conference Proceeding Series
SP - 237
EP - 250
BT - Proceedings - 32nd Annual Computer Security Applications Conference, ACSAC 2016
PB - Association for Computing Machinery
Y2 - 5 December 2016 through 9 December 2016
ER -