Multiplicity of equilibria and information structures in empirical games: challenges and prospects: Session at the 9th Triennial Choice Symposium

Ron N. Borkovsky, Paul B. Ellickson, Brett R. Gordon, Victor Aguirregabiria, Pedro Gardete, Paul Grieco, Todd Gureckis, Teck Hua Ho, Laurent Mathevet, Andrew Sweeting

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Empirical models of strategic games are central to much analysis in marketing and economics. However, two challenges in applying these models to real-world data are that such models often admit multiple equilibria and that they require strong informational assumptions. The first implies that the model does not make unique predictions about the data, and the second implies that results may be driven by strong a priori assumptions about the informational setup. This article summarizes recent work that seeks to address both issues and suggests some avenues for future research.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)115-125
Number of pages11
JournalMarketing Letters
Volume26
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 27 2015

Keywords

  • Dynamic games
  • Information structures
  • Learning
  • Multiplicity of equilibria
  • Static discrete games
  • Structural estimation

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business and International Management
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Marketing

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    Borkovsky, R. N., Ellickson, P. B., Gordon, B. R., Aguirregabiria, V., Gardete, P., Grieco, P., Gureckis, T., Ho, T. H., Mathevet, L., & Sweeting, A. (2015). Multiplicity of equilibria and information structures in empirical games: challenges and prospects: Session at the 9th Triennial Choice Symposium. Marketing Letters, 26(2), 115-125. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11002-014-9308-z