N-person non-convex bargaining: Efficient proportional solutions

Jens Leth Hougaard, Mich Tvede

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


For n-person bargaining problems the family of proportional solutions (introduced and characterized by Kalai) is generalized to bargaining problems with non-convex payoff sets. The so-called "efficient proportional solutions" are characterized axiomatically using natural extensions of the original axioms provided by Kalai.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)536-538
Number of pages3
JournalOperations Research Letters
Issue number6
StatePublished - Nov 2010


  • n-person non-convex bargaining
  • Proportional solutions
  • The egalitarian solution

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Software
  • Management Science and Operations Research
  • Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
  • Applied Mathematics


Dive into the research topics of 'N-person non-convex bargaining: Efficient proportional solutions'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this