Nano-PPUF: A memristor-based security primitive

Jeyavijayan Rajendran, Garrett S. Rose, Ramesh Karri, Miodrag Potkonjak

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

CMOS devices have been used to build hardware security primitives such as physical unclonable functions. Since MOS devices are relatively easy to model and simulate, CMOS-based security primitives are increasingly prone to modeling attacks. We propose memristor-based Public Physical Unclonable Functions (nano-PPUFs), they have complex models that are difficult to simulate. We leverage sneak path currents, process variations, and computationally intensive SPICE models as features to build the nano-PPUF. With just a few hundreds of memristors, we construct a time-bounded authentication protocol that will take several years for an attacker to compromise.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings - 2012 IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI, ISVLSI 2012
Pages84-87
Number of pages4
DOIs
StatePublished - 2012
Event2012 IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI, ISVLSI 2012 - Amherst, MA, United States
Duration: Aug 19 2012Aug 21 2012

Publication series

NameProceedings - 2012 IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI, ISVLSI 2012

Other

Other2012 IEEE Computer Society Annual Symposium on VLSI, ISVLSI 2012
CountryUnited States
CityAmherst, MA
Period8/19/128/21/12

Keywords

  • Hardware Security
  • Memristor
  • Physical Unclonable Functions
  • Process variations

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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