Nash equilibria for non-binary choice rules

José C.R. Alcantud; Carlos Alós-Ferrer

doi:10.1007/s00182-006-0060-3

Nash equilibria for non-binary choice rules

José C.R. Alcantud, Carlos Alós-Ferrer

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We prove the existence of equilibria in games with players who employ abstract (non-binary) choice rules. This framework goes beyond the standard, transitive model and encompasses games where players have non-transitive preferences (e.g., skew-symmetric bilinear preferences).

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	455-464
Number of pages	10
Journal	International Journal of Game Theory
Volume	35
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0060-3
State	Published - Feb 2007

Keywords

Non-binary choice
Non-cooperative games
SSB preferences

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Statistics and Probability
Mathematics (miscellaneous)
Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
Economics and Econometrics
Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

Access to Document

10.1007/s00182-006-0060-3

Cite this

@article{0364fa17f14f46efb9178d95884c0c83,

title = "Nash equilibria for non-binary choice rules",

abstract = "We prove the existence of equilibria in games with players who employ abstract (non-binary) choice rules. This framework goes beyond the standard, transitive model and encompasses games where players have non-transitive preferences (e.g., skew-symmetric bilinear preferences).",

keywords = "Non-binary choice, Non-cooperative games, SSB preferences",

author = "Alcantud, {Jos{\'e} C.R.} and Carlos Al{\'o}s-Ferrer",

year = "2007",

month = feb,

doi = "10.1007/s00182-006-0060-3",

language = "English (US)",

volume = "35",

pages = "455--464",

journal = "International Journal of Game Theory",

issn = "0020-7276",

publisher = "Springer Verlag",

number = "3",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Nash equilibria for non-binary choice rules

AU - Alcantud, José C.R.

AU - Alós-Ferrer, Carlos

PY - 2007/2

Y1 - 2007/2

N2 - We prove the existence of equilibria in games with players who employ abstract (non-binary) choice rules. This framework goes beyond the standard, transitive model and encompasses games where players have non-transitive preferences (e.g., skew-symmetric bilinear preferences).

AB - We prove the existence of equilibria in games with players who employ abstract (non-binary) choice rules. This framework goes beyond the standard, transitive model and encompasses games where players have non-transitive preferences (e.g., skew-symmetric bilinear preferences).

KW - Non-binary choice

KW - Non-cooperative games

KW - SSB preferences

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=33847272291&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=33847272291&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/s00182-006-0060-3

DO - 10.1007/s00182-006-0060-3

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:33847272291

SN - 0020-7276

VL - 35

SP - 455

EP - 464

JO - International Journal of Game Theory

JF - International Journal of Game Theory

IS - 3

ER -

Nash equilibria for non-binary choice rules

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this