Nash equilibrium and robust stability in dynamic games: A small-gain perspective

Iasson Karafyllis, Zhong Ping Jiang, George Athanasiou

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

This paper develops a novel methodology to study robust stability properties of Nash equilibrium points in dynamic games. Small-gain techniques in modern mathematical control theory are used for the first time to derive conditions guaranteeing uniqueness and global asymptotic stability of a Nash equilibrium point for economic models described by functional difference equations. Specification to a Cournot oligopoly game is studied in detail to demonstrate the power of the proposed methodology.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)2936-2952
Number of pages17
JournalComputers and Mathematics with Applications
Volume60
Issue number11
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 2010

Keywords

  • Cournot oligopoly
  • Dynamic game
  • Nash equilibrium
  • Robust stability
  • Small gain

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Modeling and Simulation
  • Computational Theory and Mathematics
  • Computational Mathematics

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