Negotiation in legislatures over government formation

Michael Laver, Scott de Marchi, Hande Mutlu

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


    We question results claiming to extend non-cooperative models of legislative bargaining to the theoretically general and substantively typical case with an arbitrary number of disciplined parties. We identify problems with both the derivation of formal results and empirical evaluation of these. No empirically robust formateur advantage is observed in field data on bargaining over government formation. Given this theoretical and empirical impasse, we reconsider the substantive premises that should form the foundation for any new attempt to model this fundamental political process, arguing that models should be grounded in binding constitutional constraints on the government formation process in parliamentary democracies.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)285-304
    Number of pages20
    JournalPublic Choice
    Issue number3-4
    StatePublished - Jun 2011


    • Bargaining
    • Coalition formation
    • Formateur
    • Game theory
    • Gamson's law
    • Social choice theory

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Sociology and Political Science
    • Economics and Econometrics


    Dive into the research topics of 'Negotiation in legislatures over government formation'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

    Cite this