Network formation and anti-coordination games

Yann Bramoullé, Dunia López-Pintado, Sanjeev Goyal, Fernando Vega-Redondo

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We study a setting in which individual players choose their partners as well as a mode of behavior in 2 x 2 anti-coordination games - games where a player's best response is to choose an action unlike that of her partner. We characterize the equilibrium networks as well as study the effects of network structure on individual behavior. Our analysis shows that both network architecture and induced behavior crucially depend on the value of the cost of forming links. In general, equilibrium configurations are found to be neither unique nor efficient.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1-19
Number of pages19
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Issue number1
StatePublished - Dec 2004


  • Anti-coordination games
  • Efficiency
  • Links
  • Networks

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty


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