Network formation with heterogeneous players

Andrea Galeotti; Sanjeev Goyal; Jurjen Kamphorst

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2005.02.003

Network formation with heterogeneous players

Andrea Galeotti, Sanjeev Goyal, Jurjen Kamphorst

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

This paper extends the connections model of network formation by allowing for players who are heterogeneous with respect to values as well as the costs of forming links. Our principal result is that centrality and short average distances between individuals are robust features of equilibrium networks.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	353-372
Number of pages	20
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	54
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.02.003
State	Published - Feb 2006

Keywords

Heterogeneity
Insider-outsider
Network
Non-cooperative game

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

Access to Document

10.1016/j.geb.2005.02.003

Cite this

@article{d3b542e649ac4e739da2a0008933ebea,

title = "Network formation with heterogeneous players",

abstract = "This paper extends the connections model of network formation by allowing for players who are heterogeneous with respect to values as well as the costs of forming links. Our principal result is that centrality and short average distances between individuals are robust features of equilibrium networks.",

keywords = "Heterogeneity, Insider-outsider, Network, Non-cooperative game",

author = "Andrea Galeotti and Sanjeev Goyal and Jurjen Kamphorst",

year = "2006",

month = feb,

doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2005.02.003",

language = "English (US)",

volume = "54",

pages = "353--372",

journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",

issn = "0899-8256",

publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",

number = "2",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Network formation with heterogeneous players

AU - Galeotti, Andrea

AU - Goyal, Sanjeev

AU - Kamphorst, Jurjen

PY - 2006/2

Y1 - 2006/2

N2 - This paper extends the connections model of network formation by allowing for players who are heterogeneous with respect to values as well as the costs of forming links. Our principal result is that centrality and short average distances between individuals are robust features of equilibrium networks.

AB - This paper extends the connections model of network formation by allowing for players who are heterogeneous with respect to values as well as the costs of forming links. Our principal result is that centrality and short average distances between individuals are robust features of equilibrium networks.

KW - Heterogeneity

KW - Insider-outsider

KW - Network

KW - Non-cooperative game

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=31844443026&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=31844443026&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2005.02.003

DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2005.02.003

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:31844443026

SN - 0899-8256

VL - 54

SP - 353

EP - 372

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

IS - 2

ER -

Network formation with heterogeneous players

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this