Network security as public good: A mean-field-type game theory approach

Alain Tcheukam Siwe; Hamidou Tembine

doi:10.1109/SSD.2016.7473659

Network security as public good: A mean-field-type game theory approach

Alain Tcheukam Siwe, Hamidou Tembine

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Abstract

We investigate dynamic public good games in networks consisting of strategic users with interdependent network security. The strategic users can choose their investment strategies to contribute to the basic security of the network. Mimicking the behavior of infection propagation over multi-hop networks which depends on the average degree of the network, we propose a mean-field-type model to capture the effect of the others' control actions on the security state. Using linear-quadratic differential mean-field-type games we propose and analyze two different regimes, examining the equilibria and global optima of each to address. We show that, generically, each user has a unique best response strategy to invest into security. Closed-form expressions are obtained using the recent development of mean-field-type game theory.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	13th International Multi-Conference on Systems, Signals and Devices, SSD 2016
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages	601-606
Number of pages	6
ISBN (Electronic)	9781509012916
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/SSD.2016.7473659
State	Published - May 18 2016
Event	13th International Multi-Conference on Systems, Signals and Devices, SSD 2016 - Leipzig, Germany Duration: Mar 21 2016 → Mar 24 2016

Publication series

Name	13th International Multi-Conference on Systems, Signals and Devices, SSD 2016

Other

Other	13th International Multi-Conference on Systems, Signals and Devices, SSD 2016
Country/Territory	Germany
City	Leipzig
Period	3/21/16 → 3/24/16

Keywords

Mean-field
Network security
Users' investment

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Signal Processing
Control and Systems Engineering
Energy Engineering and Power Technology
Control and Optimization
Computer Networks and Communications
Instrumentation

Access to Document

10.1109/SSD.2016.7473659

Cite this

Siwe, A. T., & Tembine, H. (2016). Network security as public good: A mean-field-type game theory approach. In 13th International Multi-Conference on Systems, Signals and Devices, SSD 2016 (pp. 601-606). Article 7473659 (13th International Multi-Conference on Systems, Signals and Devices, SSD 2016). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.. https://doi.org/10.1109/SSD.2016.7473659

Network security as public good: A mean-field-type game theory approach. / Siwe, Alain Tcheukam; Tembine, Hamidou.
13th International Multi-Conference on Systems, Signals and Devices, SSD 2016. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2016. p. 601-606 7473659 (13th International Multi-Conference on Systems, Signals and Devices, SSD 2016).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Siwe, AT & Tembine, H 2016, Network security as public good: A mean-field-type game theory approach. in 13th International Multi-Conference on Systems, Signals and Devices, SSD 2016., 7473659, 13th International Multi-Conference on Systems, Signals and Devices, SSD 2016, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 601-606, 13th International Multi-Conference on Systems, Signals and Devices, SSD 2016, Leipzig, Germany, 3/21/16. https://doi.org/10.1109/SSD.2016.7473659

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Network security as public good: A mean-field-type game theory approach

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Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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