TY - JOUR
T1 - Nominal bargaining power, selection protocol, and discounting in legislative bargaining
AU - Fréchette, Guillaume
AU - Kagel, John H.
AU - Morelli, Massimo
N1 - Funding Information:
Morelli's research was partially supported by National Science Foundation Grant No. 0213312. Kagel's research was partially supported by National Science Foundation Grants No. 0136925 and 0136928 and a grant from the Mershon Center at the Ohio State University. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation or the Mershon Center. We received valuable comments from Tom Palfrey, Eyal Winter, two anonymous referees, and participants at the ESA meetings at the University of Pittsburgh. The usual caveat applies.
Copyright:
Copyright 2018 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2005/8
Y1 - 2005/8
N2 - The comparative static predictions of the Baron and Ferejohn [Baron, D.P., and Ferejohn, J.A., (1989). Bargaining in legislatures, American Political Science Review 83 (4), 1181-1206] model better organize behavior in legislative bargaining experiments than Gamson's Law. Regressions similar to those employed in field data produce results seemingly in support of Gamson's Law (even when using data generated by simulating agents who behave according to the Baron-Ferejohn model), but this is determined by the selection protocol which recognizes voting blocks in proportion to the number of votes controlled. Proposer power is not nearly as strong as predicted in the closed rule Baron and Ferejohn model, as coalition partners refuse to take the small shares given by the continuation value of the game. Discounting pushes behavior in the direction predicted by Baron and Ferejohn but has a much smaller effect than predicted.
AB - The comparative static predictions of the Baron and Ferejohn [Baron, D.P., and Ferejohn, J.A., (1989). Bargaining in legislatures, American Political Science Review 83 (4), 1181-1206] model better organize behavior in legislative bargaining experiments than Gamson's Law. Regressions similar to those employed in field data produce results seemingly in support of Gamson's Law (even when using data generated by simulating agents who behave according to the Baron-Ferejohn model), but this is determined by the selection protocol which recognizes voting blocks in proportion to the number of votes controlled. Proposer power is not nearly as strong as predicted in the closed rule Baron and Ferejohn model, as coalition partners refuse to take the small shares given by the continuation value of the game. Discounting pushes behavior in the direction predicted by Baron and Ferejohn but has a much smaller effect than predicted.
KW - Baron and Ferejohn
KW - Gamson's Law
KW - Legislative bargaining
KW - Selection protocol
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U2 - 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.02.009
DO - 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.02.009
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:20944445760
SN - 0047-2727
VL - 89
SP - 1497
EP - 1517
JO - Journal of Public Economics
JF - Journal of Public Economics
IS - 8 SPEC. ISS.
ER -