Non-utilitarian coalition structure generation

Oskar Skibski, Henryk Michalewski, Andrzej Nagórko, Tomasz P. Michalak, Andrew Dowell, Talal Rahwan, Michael Wooldridge

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution


The coalition structure generation problem is one of the key challenges in multi-agent coalition formation. It involves partitioning a set of agents into coalitions so that system performance is optimized. To date, the multi-agent systems literature has focused exclusively on the utilitarian version of this problem which seeks to maximize the sum of the values of the coalitions involved. However, there are many examples of situations in which other performance metrics are of interest. In particular, in games with non-transferable utility, we may be more interested in an egalitarian optimal coalition structure, or in minimizing the difference between the utilities of the most affluent and poorest agents. In this paper, we present a number of exact algorithms to solve such non-utilitarian formulations of the coalition structure generation problem.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationFrontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications
EditorsGal A. Kaminka, Frank Dignum, Eyke Hullermeier, Paolo Bouquet, Virginia Dignum, Maria Fox, Frank van Harmelen
PublisherIOS Press
Number of pages2
ISBN (Electronic)9781614996712
StatePublished - 2016
Event22nd European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, ECAI 2016 - The Hague, Netherlands
Duration: Aug 29 2016Sep 2 2016

Publication series

NameFrontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications
ISSN (Print)0922-6389


Other22nd European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, ECAI 2016
CityThe Hague

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Artificial Intelligence


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