TY - JOUR
T1 - Not All Fabrics Are Created Equal
T2 - Exploring eFPGA Parameters for IP Redaction
AU - Bhandari, Jitendra
AU - Moosa, Abdul Khader Thalakkattu
AU - Tan, Benjamin
AU - Pilato, Christian
AU - Gore, Ganesh
AU - Tang, Xifan
AU - Temple, Scott
AU - Gaillardon, Pierre Emmanuel
AU - Karri, Ramesh
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 1993-2012 IEEE.
PY - 2023/10/1
Y1 - 2023/10/1
N2 - Semiconductor design houses rely on third-party foundries to manufacture their integrated circuits (ICs). While this trend allows them to tackle fabrication costs, it introduces security concerns as external (and potentially malicious) parties can access critical parts of the designs and steal or modify the intellectual property (IP). Embedded field-programmable gate array (eFPGA) redaction is a promising technique to protect critical IPs of an ASIC by redacting (i.e., removing) critical parts and mapping them onto a custom reconfigurable fabric. Only trusted parties will receive the correct bitstream to restore the redacted functionality. While previous studies imply that using an eFPGA is a sufficient condition to provide security against IP threats like reverse-engineering, whether this truly holds for all eFPGA architectures is unclear, thus motivating the study in this article. We examine the security of eFPGA fabrics generated by varying different FPGA design parameters. We characterize the power, performance, and area (PPA) characteristics and evaluate each fabric's resistance to Boolean satisfiability (SAT)-based bitstream recovery. Our results encourage designers to work with custom eFPGA fabrics rather than off-The-shelf commercial FPGAs and reveals that only considering a redaction fabric's bitstream size is inadequate for gauging security.
AB - Semiconductor design houses rely on third-party foundries to manufacture their integrated circuits (ICs). While this trend allows them to tackle fabrication costs, it introduces security concerns as external (and potentially malicious) parties can access critical parts of the designs and steal or modify the intellectual property (IP). Embedded field-programmable gate array (eFPGA) redaction is a promising technique to protect critical IPs of an ASIC by redacting (i.e., removing) critical parts and mapping them onto a custom reconfigurable fabric. Only trusted parties will receive the correct bitstream to restore the redacted functionality. While previous studies imply that using an eFPGA is a sufficient condition to provide security against IP threats like reverse-engineering, whether this truly holds for all eFPGA architectures is unclear, thus motivating the study in this article. We examine the security of eFPGA fabrics generated by varying different FPGA design parameters. We characterize the power, performance, and area (PPA) characteristics and evaluate each fabric's resistance to Boolean satisfiability (SAT)-based bitstream recovery. Our results encourage designers to work with custom eFPGA fabrics rather than off-The-shelf commercial FPGAs and reveals that only considering a redaction fabric's bitstream size is inadequate for gauging security.
KW - Embedded field programmable gate array (eFPGA)
KW - hardware security
KW - intellectual property (IP) redaction
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U2 - 10.1109/TVLSI.2023.3301334
DO - 10.1109/TVLSI.2023.3301334
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85168678643
SN - 1063-8210
VL - 31
SP - 1459
EP - 1471
JO - IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems
JF - IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI) Systems
IS - 10
ER -