On an anomaly of the deterrent effect of punishment

Ariel Rubinstein

doi:10.1016/0165-1765(80)90062-2

On an anomaly of the deterrent effect of punishment

Ariel Rubinstein

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

A two period choice problem is presented. An individual has to choose in each period between legal and illegal activities. Two punishment policies are compared: (1) The maximal punishment is imposed even for a first offense. (2) A new offender gets a reduced punishment. It is proved that for a given policy of type 1 there exist a utility function and a policy of type 2 which yields a better deterrent on individual characterized by this utility function.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	89-94
Number of pages	6
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	6
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(80)90062-2
State	Published - 1980

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/0165-1765(80)90062-2

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On an anomaly of the deterrent effect of punishment

Abstract

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