On combining implementable social choice rules

Jean Pierre Benoît; Efe A. Ok; M. Remzi Sanver

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2005.11.001

On combining implementable social choice rules

Jean Pierre Benoît, Efe A. Ok, M. Remzi Sanver

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We study if (and when) the intersections and unions of social choice rules that are implementable with respect to a certain equilibrium concept are themselves implementable with respect to that equilibrium concept. Our results for dominant strategy equilibrium are mostly of negative nature; similarly, the intersection of Nash implementable SCCs need not be Nash implementable. On the other hand, we find that the union of any set of Nash implementable social choice rules is Nash implementable (for societies of at least three constituents). This last observation allows us to formulate the notion of the largest Nash implementable subcorrespondence of a social choice rule.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	20-30
Number of pages	11
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	60
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.11.001
State	Published - Jul 2007

Keywords

Dominant strategy implementation
Largest implementable subcorrespondence
Maskin monotonicity
Minimal monotonic extension
Nash implementation

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.geb.2005.11.001

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abstract = "We study if (and when) the intersections and unions of social choice rules that are implementable with respect to a certain equilibrium concept are themselves implementable with respect to that equilibrium concept. Our results for dominant strategy equilibrium are mostly of negative nature; similarly, the intersection of Nash implementable SCCs need not be Nash implementable. On the other hand, we find that the union of any set of Nash implementable social choice rules is Nash implementable (for societies of at least three constituents). This last observation allows us to formulate the notion of the largest Nash implementable subcorrespondence of a social choice rule.",

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AB - We study if (and when) the intersections and unions of social choice rules that are implementable with respect to a certain equilibrium concept are themselves implementable with respect to that equilibrium concept. Our results for dominant strategy equilibrium are mostly of negative nature; similarly, the intersection of Nash implementable SCCs need not be Nash implementable. On the other hand, we find that the union of any set of Nash implementable social choice rules is Nash implementable (for societies of at least three constituents). This last observation allows us to formulate the notion of the largest Nash implementable subcorrespondence of a social choice rule.

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KW - Largest implementable subcorrespondence

KW - Maskin monotonicity

KW - Minimal monotonic extension

KW - Nash implementation

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On combining implementable social choice rules

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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