TY - JOUR
T1 - On human capital and team stability
AU - Chiappori, Pierre André
AU - Galichon, Alfred
AU - Salanié, Bernard
N1 - Funding Information:
We thank Yeon-Koo Che, Navin Kartik, the editor and reviewers, and especially Arnaud Dupuy, Fuhito Kojima, and Phil Reny for useful comments. This paper builds on material from an unpublished manuscript circulated under the name “The Roommate Problem Is More Stable Than You Think,” which is now obsolete. Chiappori gratefully acknowledges financial support fromthe National Science Foundation(NSF; award1124277), andl’Agence nationale de la recherche (ANR [France]; grant Famineq). Galichon gratefully acknowledges funding from NSF grant DMS-1716489, European Research Council grants FP7-295298, FP7-312503, and FP7-337665, and ANR grant Famineq.
Funding Information:
We thank Yeon-Koo Che, Navin Kartik, the editor and reviewers, and especially Arnaud Dupuy, Fuhito Kojima, and Phil Reny for useful comments. This paper builds on material from an unpublished manuscript circulated under the name “The Roommate Problem Is More Stable Than You Think,” which is now obsolete. Chiappori gratefully acknowledges financialsupportfromtheNationalScienceFoundation(NSF;award1124277),andl’Agence nationale de la recherche (ANR [France]; grant Famineq). Galichon gratefully acknowledges funding from NSF grant DMS-1716489, European Research Council grants FP7-295298, FP7-312503, and FP7-337665, and ANR grant Famineq.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
PY - 2019/6/1
Y1 - 2019/6/1
N2 - In many economic contexts, agents from the same population team up to better exploit their human capital. In such contexts (often called “roommate matching problems”), stable matchings may fail to exist even when utility is transferable. We show that when each individual has a close substitute, a stable matching can be implemented with minimal policy intervention. Our results shed light on the stability of partnerships in the labor market. Moreover, they imply that the tools crafted in empirical studies of the marriage problem can easily be adapted to many roommate problems.
AB - In many economic contexts, agents from the same population team up to better exploit their human capital. In such contexts (often called “roommate matching problems”), stable matchings may fail to exist even when utility is transferable. We show that when each individual has a close substitute, a stable matching can be implemented with minimal policy intervention. Our results shed light on the stability of partnerships in the labor market. Moreover, they imply that the tools crafted in empirical studies of the marriage problem can easily be adapted to many roommate problems.
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U2 - 10.1086/702925
DO - 10.1086/702925
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85066487213
SN - 1932-8575
VL - 13
SP - 236
EP - 259
JO - Journal of Human Capital
JF - Journal of Human Capital
IS - 2
ER -