On information design in games

Laurent Mathevet, Jacopo Perego, Ina Taneva

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    Information provision in games influences behavior by affecting agents’ beliefs about the state as well as their higher-order beliefs. We first characterize the extent to which a designer can manipulate agents’ beliefs by disclosing information. We then describe the structure of optimal belief distributions, including a concave-envelope representation that subsumes the single-agent result of Kamenica and Gentzkow. This result holds under various solution concepts and outcome selection rules. Finally, we use our approach to compute an optimal information structure in an investment game under adversarial equilibrium selection.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)1370-1404
    Number of pages35
    JournalJournal of Political Economy
    Volume128
    Issue number4
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Apr 1 2020

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics

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  • Cite this

    Mathevet, L., Perego, J., & Taneva, I. (2020). On information design in games. Journal of Political Economy, 128(4), 1370-1404. https://doi.org/10.1086/705332