@article{28251e82fb5c41c6890814bc8ff735fd,
title = "On information design in games",
abstract = "Information provision in games influences behavior by affecting agents{\textquoteright} beliefs about the state as well as their higher-order beliefs. We first characterize the extent to which a designer can manipulate agents{\textquoteright} beliefs by disclosing information. We then describe the structure of optimal belief distributions, including a concave-envelope representation that subsumes the single-agent result of Kamenica and Gentzkow. This result holds under various solution concepts and outcome selection rules. Finally, we use our approach to compute an optimal information structure in an investment game under adversarial equilibrium selection.",
author = "Laurent Mathevet and Jacopo Perego and Ina Taneva",
note = "Funding Information: Foundation conference and to Philippe Jehiel, Elliot Lipnowski, Stephen Morris, David Pearce, J{\'o}zsef S{\'a}kovics, and Siyang Xiong for their helpful comments and conversations. We are also grateful to Andrew Clausen, Olivier Compte, Jon Eguia, Willemien Kets, Matt Jackson, Qingmin Liu, Efe Ok, Ennio Stacchetti, and Max Stinchcombe, as well as to seminar audiences at Columbia University, Institut d{\textquoteright}An{\`a}lisi Econ{\`o}mica, New York University, Michigan State University, the Paris School of Economics, Stony Brook University, the University of Cambridge, the University of Edinburgh, the University of Texas at Austin, the SIRE (Scottish Institute for Research in Economics) BIC (Behaviors, Incentives and Contracts) Workshop, the 2016 Decentralization Conference, the 2016 Canadian Economic Theory conference, the 2016 Cowles Foundation conference, the 2016 North American Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society, and the SAET (Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory) Conference 2017. Taneva acknowledges financial support from ESRC (Economic and Social Research Council) grant ES/N00776X/1. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2020 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.",
year = "2020",
month = apr,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1086/705332",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "128",
pages = "1370--1404",
journal = "Journal of Political Economy",
issn = "0022-3808",
publisher = "University of Chicago",
number = "4",
}