On the determinants of cooperation in infinitely repeated games: A survey

Pedro Dal Bó, Guillaume R. Fréchette

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    Abstract

    A growing experimental literature studies the determinants of cooperation in infinitely repeated games, tests different predictions of the theory, and suggests an empirical solution to the problem of multiple equilibria. To provide a robust description of the literature's findings, we gather and analyze a metadata set of experiments on infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games. The experimental data show that cooperation is affected by infinite repetition and is more likely to arise when it can be supported in equilibrium. However, the fact that cooperation can be supported in equilibrium does not imply that most subjects will cooperate. High cooperation rates will emerge only when the parameters of the repeated game are such that cooperation is very robust to strategic uncertainty. We also review the results regarding the effect of imperfect monitoring, changing partners, and personal characteristics on cooperation and the strategies used to support it.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)60-114
    Number of pages55
    JournalJournal of Economic Literature
    Volume56
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Mar 2018

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics

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