On the Difficulty of Inserting Trojans in Reversible Computing Architectures

Xiaotong Cui, Samah Mohamed Saeed, Alwin Zulehner, Robert Wille, Kaijie Wu, Rolf Drechsler, Ramesh Karri

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


Fabrication-less design houses outsource their designs to third-party foundries to lower fabrication cost. However, this creates opportunities for a rogue in the semiconductor foundry to introduce hardware Trojans, which stay inactive most of the time and cause unintended consequences to the system when triggered. Hardware Trojans in traditional CMOSbased circuits have been studied, and Design-for-Trust (DFT) techniques have been proposed to detect them.

Original languageEnglish (US)
JournalIEEE Transactions on Emerging Topics in Computing
StateAccepted/In press - Apr 4 2018


  • Adders
  • Ancillary Inputs
  • Design for Trust
  • Foundries
  • Hardware
  • Hardware Trojans
  • Integrated circuits
  • Logic gates
  • Reversible Circuits
  • Scrambling
  • Security
  • Trojan horses

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Science (miscellaneous)
  • Information Systems
  • Human-Computer Interaction
  • Computer Science Applications

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