On the effectiveness of elected male and female leaders and team coordination

Ernesto Reuben, Krisztina Timko

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

We study the effect on coordination in a minimum-effort game of a leader’s gender depending on whether the leader is democratically elected or is randomly selected. Leaders use non-binding messages to try to convince followers to coordinate on the Pareto-efficient equilibrium. We find that teams with elected leaders coordinate on higher effort levels. Initially, the benefits of being elected are captured solely by male leaders. However, this gender difference disappears with repeated interaction because unsuccessful male leaders are reelected more often than unsuccessful female leaders.
Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)123-135
JournalJournal of the Economic Science Association
Volume4
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 13 2018

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