On the fictitious play and channel selection games

S. M. Perlaza, H. Tembine, S. Lasaulce, V. Quintero-Florez

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

Considering the interaction through mutual interference of the different radio devices, the channel selection (CS) problem in decentralized parallel multiple access channels can be modeled by strategic-form games. Here, we show that the CS problem is a potential game (PG) and thus the fictitious play (FP) converges to a Nash equilibrium (NE) either in pure or mixed strategies. Using a 2-player 2-channel game, it is shown that convergence in mixed strategies might lead to cycles of action profiles which lead to individual spectral efficiencies (SE) which are worse than the SE at the worst NE in mixed and pure strategies. Finally, exploiting the fact that the CS problem is a PG and an aggregation game, we present a method to implement FP with local information and minimum feedback.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2010 IEEE Latin-American Conference on Communications, LATINCOM 2010 - Conference Proceedings
DOIs
StatePublished - 2010
Event2010 IEEE Latin-American Conference on Communications, LATINCOM 2010 - Bogota, Colombia
Duration: Sep 15 2010Sep 17 2010

Publication series

Name2010 IEEE Latin-American Conference on Communications, LATINCOM 2010 - Conference Proceedings

Other

Other2010 IEEE Latin-American Conference on Communications, LATINCOM 2010
Country/TerritoryColombia
CityBogota
Period9/15/109/17/10

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Communication

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