On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall

Michele Piccione, Ariel Rubinstein

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    Abstract

    We argue that in extensive decision problems (extensive games with a single player) withimperfectrecall care must be taken in interpreting information sets and strategies. Alternative interpretations allow for different kinds of analysis. We address the following issues: 1. randomization at information sets; 2. consistent beliefs; 3. time consistency of optimal plans; 4. the multiselves approach to decision making. We illustrate our discussion through an example that we call the "paradox of the absentminded driver."Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C7, D0.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)3-24
    Number of pages22
    JournalGames and Economic Behavior
    Volume20
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Jul 1997

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Finance
    • Economics and Econometrics

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