@article{18743126a307450cbac4cf1923ac60ef,
title = "On the Interpretation of Decision Problems with Imperfect Recall",
abstract = "We argue that in extensive decision problems (extensive games with a single player) withimperfectrecall care must be taken in interpreting information sets and strategies. Alternative interpretations allow for different kinds of analysis. We address the following issues: 1. randomization at information sets; 2. consistent beliefs; 3. time consistency of optimal plans; 4. the multiselves approach to decision making. We illustrate our discussion through an example that we call the {"}paradox of the absentminded driver.{"}Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C7, D0.",
author = "Michele Piccione and Ariel Rubinstein",
note = "Funding Information: * The {\textregistered}rst author acknowledges {\textregistered}nancial support from SSHRC-Canada. The second author acknowledges partial {\textregistered}nancial support from the United States—Israel Binational Science Foundation, Grant Number 1011-341. We are grateful to the University of Oslo and New York University for their hospitality, and to Cafe Tamar in Tel Aviv for providing an inspiring atmosphere. We thank Bob Aumann, Paolo Battigalli, Sergiu Hart, Dana Heller, Bart Lipman , Avishai Margalit, Roger Myerson, Hugh Neary, Motty Perry, Tim Van Zandt, and Ruth Weintraub for their comments on earlier versions of this paper.",
year = "1997",
month = jul,
doi = "10.1006/game.1997.0536",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "20",
pages = "3--24",
journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",
issn = "0899-8256",
publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",
number = "1",
}