On the Irrelevance of Risk Attitudes in Repeated Two-Outcome Games

John Wooders, Jason M. Shachat

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We study equilibrium and maximin play in supergames consisting of the sequential play of a finite collection of stage games, where each stage game has two outcomes for each player. We show that for two-player supergames in which each stage game is strictly competitive, in any Nash equilibrium of the supergame, play at each stage is a Nash equilibrium of the stage game provided preferences over certain supergame outcomes satisfy a natural monotonicity condition. In particular, equilibrium play does not depend on risk attitudes. We establish an invariance result for games with more than two players when the solution concept is subgame perfection. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C9.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)342-363
Number of pages22
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Issue number2
StatePublished - Feb 2001


  • Maximin
  • Repeated games
  • Risk attitudes
  • Zero-sum

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics


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