On the security of random key pre-distribution schemes

Mahalingam Ramkumar, Nasir Memon

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

Key pre-distribution (KPD) schemes, which are inherently trade-offs between security and complexity, are perhaps well suited for securing large-scale deployments of resource constrained nodes without persistent access to a trusted authority (TA). However, the need to offset their inherent security limitations, calls for some degree of tamper-resistance of nodes. Obviously, if absolute tamper-resistance is guaranteed, KPD schemes are rendered secure. In practice, however, tamper-resistance will have some limitations which will be exploited by attackers. In this paper, we analyze the security of deployments of random key pre-distribution schemes based on some assumptions on the "extent of tamper-resistance." We argue that a "limited extent of tamper resistance" when used in conjunction with a mechanism for "periodic key updates," drastically improves the security of (especially random) KPD schemes.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings fron the Fifth Annual IEEE System, Man and Cybernetics Information Assurance Workshop, SMC
Pages153-160
Number of pages8
StatePublished - 2004
EventProceedings fron the Fifth Annual IEEE System, Man and Cybernetics Information Assurance Workshop, SMC - West Point, NY, United States
Duration: Jun 10 2004Jun 11 2004

Publication series

NameProceedings fron the Fifth Annual IEEE System, Man and Cybernetics Information Assurance Workshop, SMC

Other

OtherProceedings fron the Fifth Annual IEEE System, Man and Cybernetics Information Assurance Workshop, SMC
CountryUnited States
CityWest Point, NY
Period6/10/046/11/04

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Engineering(all)

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