One-Way Spillovers, Endogenous Innovator/Imitator Roles, and Research Joint Ventures

Rabah Amir; John Wooders

doi:10.1006/game.1999.0734

One-Way Spillovers, Endogenous Innovator/Imitator Roles, and Research Joint Ventures

Rabah Amir, John Wooders

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We consider a two-period duopoly characterized by a one-way spillover structure in process R&D and a very broad specification of product market competition. We show that a priori identical firms always engage in different levels of R&D, at equilibrium, thus giving rise to an innovator/imitator configuration and ending up with different sizes. We also provide a general analysis of the social benefits of, and firms' incentive for, forming research joint ventures. Another contribution is methodological, illustrating how submodularity (R&D decisions are strategic substitutes) can be exploited to provide a general analysis of a R&D game. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, L13, O31.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	1-25
Number of pages	25
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	31
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0734
State	Published - Apr 2000

Keywords

Oligopolistic R&D
One-way spillovers
Research joint ventures
Submodularity

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1006/game.1999.0734

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AB - We consider a two-period duopoly characterized by a one-way spillover structure in process R&D and a very broad specification of product market competition. We show that a priori identical firms always engage in different levels of R&D, at equilibrium, thus giving rise to an innovator/imitator configuration and ending up with different sizes. We also provide a general analysis of the social benefits of, and firms' incentive for, forming research joint ventures. Another contribution is methodological, illustrating how submodularity (R&D decisions are strategic substitutes) can be exploited to provide a general analysis of a R&D game. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, L13, O31.

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One-Way Spillovers, Endogenous Innovator/Imitator Roles, and Research Joint Ventures

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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