Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring

Dilip Abreu, David Pearce, Ennio Stacchetti

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    There exist optimal symmetric equilibria in the Green-Porter model [4, 8] having an elementary intertemporal structure. Such an equilibrium is described entirely by two subsets of price space and two quantities, the only production levels used by firms in any contingency. The central technique employed in the analysis is the reduction of the repeated game to a family of static games.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)251-269
    Number of pages19
    JournalJournal of Economic Theory
    Volume39
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Jun 1986

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Economics and Econometrics

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