Optimal information disclosure policies in strategic queueing games

Eran Simhon, Yezekael Hayel, David Starobinski, Quanyan Zhu

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


Information about queue length is an important parameter for customers who face the decision whether to join a queue or not. In this paper, we study how optimal information disclosure policies can be used by a service provider of an M/M/1 queue to increase its revenue. Our main contribution is showing that the intuitive policy of informing customers about the current queue length when it is short and hiding this information when it is long is never optimal.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)109-113
Number of pages5
JournalOperations Research Letters
Issue number1
StatePublished - Jan 1 2016


  • Partial information system
  • Queueing games
  • Revenue optimization

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Software
  • Management Science and Operations Research
  • Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
  • Applied Mathematics


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