Optimal information disclosure policies in strategic queueing games

Eran Simhon; Yezekael Hayel; David Starobinski; Quanyan Zhu

doi:10.1016/j.orl.2015.12.005

Optimal information disclosure policies in strategic queueing games

Eran Simhon, Yezekael Hayel, David Starobinski, Quanyan Zhu

Electrical and Computer Engineering

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Information about queue length is an important parameter for customers who face the decision whether to join a queue or not. In this paper, we study how optimal information disclosure policies can be used by a service provider of an M/M/1 queue to increase its revenue. Our main contribution is showing that the intuitive policy of informing customers about the current queue length when it is short and hiding this information when it is long is never optimal.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	109-113
Number of pages	5
Journal	Operations Research Letters
Volume	44
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2015.12.005
State	Published - Jan 1 2016

Keywords

Partial information system
Queueing games
Revenue optimization

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Software
Management Science and Operations Research
Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering
Applied Mathematics

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10.1016/j.orl.2015.12.005

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KW - Revenue optimization

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Optimal information disclosure policies in strategic queueing games

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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