OPTIMAL THREATS.

Steven J. Brams, D. Marc Kilgour

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    Abstract

    We analyze the policy of tit-for-tat in a Threat Game based on Chicken, in which each player can initially choose any level of preemption or non-cooperation. If one player is more preemptive than the other, the less preemptive player can retaliate; if the players preempt at the same level, neither can retaliate. After these choices, the game terminates, with the players' payoffs based on both the payoffs of Chicken and their levels of preemption and retaliation. An analysis of Nash equilibria shows the Deterrence Equilibrium (neither player preempts, but both threaten to retaliate if preempted) to be the most compelling solution to this game; a player's choice of his strategy associated with this equilibrium renders any level of preemption by his opponent costly.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)524-536
    Number of pages13
    JournalOperations Research
    Volume35
    Issue number4
    DOIs
    StatePublished - 1987

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Computer Science Applications
    • Management Science and Operations Research

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