Optimal Timing in Dynamic and Robust Attacker Engagement during Advanced Persistent Threats

Keyphrases

• Active Defense 33%
• Active Defense Technology 33%
• Advanced Persistent Threat 100%
• Adversary 33%
• Attacker 100%
• Attacker Engagement 100%
• Conceptual Network 33%
• Continuous State Space 33%
• Deception 33%
• Honeynet 33%
• Infinite-horizon Markov Decision Process 33%
• Information Asymmetry 33%
• Insider 33%
• Network Defense 33%
• Networked Systems 33%
• Optimal Timing 100%
• Social Engineering 33%
• Stackelberg Game 33%
• Stealthy Attack 33%

Computer Science

• Advanced Persistent Threat 100%
• Attackers 100%
• Gather Information 20%
• Honeynets 20%
• Information Asymmetry 20%
• Markov Decision Process 20%
• Network Defense 20%
• stackelberg game 20%
• State Space 20%
• Stealthy Attack 20%

Economics, Econometrics and Finance

• Information Asymmetry 100%