Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching

Federico Echenique, Alfred Galichon

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    We characterize solutions for two-sided matching, both in the transferable- and in the nontransferable-utility frameworks, using a cardinal formulation. Our approach makes the comparison of the matching models with and without transfers particularly transparent. We introduce the concept of a no-trade stable matching to study the role of transfers in matching. A no-trade stable matching is one in which the availability of transfers does not affect the outcome.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)63-77
    Number of pages15
    JournalGames and Economic Behavior
    Volume101
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Jan 1 2017

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    Keywords

    • Market design
    • Matching theory
    • National resident matching program

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Finance
    • Economics and Econometrics

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