Overlapping generations games with mixed strategies

Olivier Gossner

doi:10.1287/moor.21.2.477

Overlapping generations games with mixed strategies

Olivier Gossner

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

This paper proves a Folk Theorem for overlapping generations games in the case where the mixed strategies used by a player are not observable by the others, but only their realizations are public.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	477-486
Number of pages	10
Journal	Mathematics of Operations Research
Volume	21
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.21.2.477
State	Published - May 1996

Keywords

Folk Theorem
Mixed strategy
Overlapping generations
Repeated game

ASJC Scopus subject areas

General Mathematics
Computer Science Applications
Management Science and Operations Research

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10.1287/moor.21.2.477

Cite this

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title = "Overlapping generations games with mixed strategies",

abstract = "This paper proves a Folk Theorem for overlapping generations games in the case where the mixed strategies used by a player are not observable by the others, but only their realizations are public.",

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Overlapping generations games with mixed strategies

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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