Passive data link layer 802.11 wireless device driver fingerprinting

Jason Franklin, Damon McCoy, Parisa Tabriz, Vicentiu Neagoe, Jamie van Randwyk, Douglas Sicker

    Research output: Contribution to conferencePaperpeer-review


    Motivated by the proliferation of wireless-enabled devices and the suspect nature of device driver code, we develop a passive fingerprinting technique that identifies the wireless device driver running on an IEEE 802.11 compliant device. This technique is valuable to an attacker wishing to conduct reconnaissance against a potential target so that he may launch a driver-specific exploit. In particular, we develop a unique fingerprinting technique that accurately and efficiently identifies the wireless driver without modification to or cooperation from a wireless device. We perform an evaluation of this fingerprinting technique that shows it both quickly and accurately fingerprints wireless device drivers in real world wireless network conditions. Finally, we discuss ways to prevent fingerprinting that will aid in improving the security of wireless communication for devices that employ 802.11 networking.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Number of pages12
    StatePublished - Jan 1 2006
    Event15th USENIX Security Symposium - Vancouver, Canada
    Duration: Jul 31 2006Aug 4 2006


    Conference15th USENIX Security Symposium

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Computer Networks and Communications
    • Information Systems
    • Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality


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