Pay to change lanes: A cooperative lane-changing strategy for connected/automated driving

Dianchao Lin, Li Li, Saif Eddin Jabari

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


This paper proposes a cooperative lane changing strategy using a transferable utility games framework. This allows vehicles to engage in transactions where gaps in traffic are created in exchange for monetary compensation. The proposed approach is best suited to discretionary lane change maneuvers. We formulate gains in travel time, referred to as time differences, that result from achieving higher speeds. These time differences, coupled with value of time, are used to formulate a utility function, where utility is transferable. We also allow for games between connected vehicles that do not involve transfer of utility. We apply Nash bargaining theory to solve the latter. A cellular automaton is developed and utilized to perform simulation experiments that explore the impact of such transactions on traffic conditions (travel-time savings, resulting speed-density relations and shock wave formation) and the benefit to vehicles. The results show that lane changing with transferable utility between drivers can help achieve win-win results, improve both individual and social benefits without resulting in any adverse effects on traffic characteristics in general and, in fact, result in slight improvement at traffic densities outside of free-flow and (bumper-to-bumper) jammed traffic.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)550-564
Number of pages15
JournalTransportation Research Part C: Emerging Technologies
StatePublished - Aug 2019


  • Connected vehicles
  • Cooperative game theory
  • Lane changing
  • Mobile payment
  • Side payment
  • Transferable utility

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Civil and Structural Engineering
  • Automotive Engineering
  • Transportation
  • Computer Science Applications


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