Physical layer attacks on unlinkability in wireless LANs

Kevin Bauer; Damon McCoy; Ben Greenstein; Dirk Grunwald; Douglas Sicker

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-03168-7_7

Physical layer attacks on unlinkability in wireless LANs

Kevin Bauer, Damon McCoy, Ben Greenstein, Dirk Grunwald, Douglas Sicker

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Abstract

Recent work has focused on hiding explicit network identifiers such as hardware addresses from the link layer to enable anonymous communications in wireless LANs. These protocols encrypt entire wireless packets, thereby providing unlinkability. However, we find that these protocols neglect to hide identifying information that is preserved within the wireless physical layer. We propose a technique using commodity wireless hardware whereby packets can be linked to their respective transmitters using signal strength information, thus degrading users' anonymity. We discuss possible countermeasures, but ultimately we argue that controlling information leakage at the physical layer is inherently difficult.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	Privacy Enhancing Technologies - 9th International Symposium, PETS 2009, Proceedings
Pages	108-127
Number of pages	20
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03168-7_7
State	Published - 2009
Event	9th International Symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies, PETS 2009 - Seattle, WA, United States Duration: Aug 5 2009 → Aug 7 2009

Publication series

Name	Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume	5672 LNCS
ISSN (Print)	0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)	1611-3349

Other

Other	9th International Symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies, PETS 2009
Country/Territory	United States
City	Seattle, WA
Period	8/5/09 → 8/7/09

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Theoretical Computer Science
General Computer Science

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10.1007/978-3-642-03168-7_7

Cite this

Bauer, K., McCoy, D., Greenstein, B., Grunwald, D., & Sicker, D. (2009). Physical layer attacks on unlinkability in wireless LANs. In Privacy Enhancing Technologies - 9th International Symposium, PETS 2009, Proceedings (pp. 108-127). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 5672 LNCS). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03168-7_7

Physical layer attacks on unlinkability in wireless LANs. / Bauer, Kevin; McCoy, Damon; Greenstein, Ben et al.
Privacy Enhancing Technologies - 9th International Symposium, PETS 2009, Proceedings. 2009. p. 108-127 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); Vol. 5672 LNCS).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Bauer, K, McCoy, D, Greenstein, B, Grunwald, D & Sicker, D 2009, Physical layer attacks on unlinkability in wireless LANs. in Privacy Enhancing Technologies - 9th International Symposium, PETS 2009, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics), vol. 5672 LNCS, pp. 108-127, 9th International Symposium on Privacy Enhancing Technologies, PETS 2009, Seattle, WA, United States, 8/5/09. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03168-7_7

Bauer K, McCoy D, Greenstein B, Grunwald D, Sicker D. Physical layer attacks on unlinkability in wireless LANs. In Privacy Enhancing Technologies - 9th International Symposium, PETS 2009, Proceedings. 2009. p. 108-127. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)). doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-03168-7_7

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Physical layer attacks on unlinkability in wireless LANs

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