TY - GEN
T1 - PMU and communication infrastructure restoration for post-attack observability recovery of power grids
AU - Edib, Shamsun Nahar
AU - Lin, Yuzhang
AU - Vokkarane, Vinod
AU - Qiu, Feng
AU - Yao, Rui
AU - Zhao, Dongbo
N1 - Funding Information:
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT This work was supported in part by the National Science Foundation (NSF) Award No. 1947617, in part by the NSF Award No. 2008530, and in part by Advanced Grid Modeling Program at the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Electricity under Grant DE-OE0000875.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 IEEE.
PY - 2020/11/11
Y1 - 2020/11/11
N2 - This paper is concerned about recovering the observability of cyber-physical power grids after massive cyber attacks, which helps to achieve the cyber-physical resilience of the grids. For recovering the observability of the grid, the measurability of the Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) and the connectivity of the communication network are needed to be restored. The PMU and communication infrastructure restorations are jointly formulated as a Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP) problem to minimize the observability loss of the grid over time after a cyber attack while considering the constraint of limited resources. The efficacy of the proposed optimal restoration strategy is verified by comparing with heuristic methods on the IEEE 57-bus system.
AB - This paper is concerned about recovering the observability of cyber-physical power grids after massive cyber attacks, which helps to achieve the cyber-physical resilience of the grids. For recovering the observability of the grid, the measurability of the Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) and the connectivity of the communication network are needed to be restored. The PMU and communication infrastructure restorations are jointly formulated as a Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP) problem to minimize the observability loss of the grid over time after a cyber attack while considering the constraint of limited resources. The efficacy of the proposed optimal restoration strategy is verified by comparing with heuristic methods on the IEEE 57-bus system.
KW - Cyber security
KW - Phasor measurement unit
KW - Power system communication
KW - Resilience
KW - Restoration
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85099467205&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85099467205&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1109/SmartGridComm47815.2020.9303014
DO - 10.1109/SmartGridComm47815.2020.9303014
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85099467205
T3 - 2020 IEEE International Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids, SmartGridComm 2020
BT - 2020 IEEE International Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids, SmartGridComm 2020
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
T2 - 2020 IEEE International Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids, SmartGridComm 2020
Y2 - 11 November 2020 through 13 November 2020
ER -