TY - JOUR
T1 - Political and naturalistic conceptions of human rights
T2 - A false polemic?
AU - Liao, S. Matthew
AU - Etinson, Adam
N1 - Copyright:
Copyright 2012 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.
PY - 2012
Y1 - 2012
N2 - What are human rights? According to one longstanding account, the Naturalistic Conception of human rights, human rights are those that we have simply in virtue of being human. In recent years, however, a new and purportedly alternative conception of human rights has become increasingly popular. This is the so-called Political Conception of human rights, the proponents of which include John Rawls, Charles Beitz, and Joseph Raz. In this paper we argue for three claims. First, we demonstrate that Naturalistic Conceptions of human rights can accommodate two of the most salient concerns that proponents of the Political Conception have raised about them. Second, we argue that the theoretical distance between Naturalistic and Political Conceptions is not as great as it has been made out to be. Finally, we argue that a Political Conception of human rights, on its own, lacks the resources necessary to determine the substantive content of human rights. If we are right, not only should the Naturalistic Conception not be rejected, the Political Conception is in fact incomplete without the theoretical resources that a Naturalistic Conception characteristically provides. These three claims, in tandem, provide a fresh and largely conciliatory perspective on the ongoing debate between proponents of Political and Naturalistic Conceptions of human rights.
AB - What are human rights? According to one longstanding account, the Naturalistic Conception of human rights, human rights are those that we have simply in virtue of being human. In recent years, however, a new and purportedly alternative conception of human rights has become increasingly popular. This is the so-called Political Conception of human rights, the proponents of which include John Rawls, Charles Beitz, and Joseph Raz. In this paper we argue for three claims. First, we demonstrate that Naturalistic Conceptions of human rights can accommodate two of the most salient concerns that proponents of the Political Conception have raised about them. Second, we argue that the theoretical distance between Naturalistic and Political Conceptions is not as great as it has been made out to be. Finally, we argue that a Political Conception of human rights, on its own, lacks the resources necessary to determine the substantive content of human rights. If we are right, not only should the Naturalistic Conception not be rejected, the Political Conception is in fact incomplete without the theoretical resources that a Naturalistic Conception characteristically provides. These three claims, in tandem, provide a fresh and largely conciliatory perspective on the ongoing debate between proponents of Political and Naturalistic Conceptions of human rights.
KW - Charles Beitz
KW - Human rights
KW - James Griffin
KW - John Rawls
KW - John Tasioulas
KW - Joseph Raz
KW - naturalistic conception
KW - orthodox conception
KW - philosophical foundation
KW - political conception
KW - practical conception
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U2 - 10.1163/17455243-00903008
DO - 10.1163/17455243-00903008
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84864704338
VL - 9
SP - 327
EP - 352
JO - Journal of Moral Philosophy
JF - Journal of Moral Philosophy
SN - 1740-4681
IS - 3
ER -