Political groups, leader change, and the pattern of international cooperation

Alastair Smith

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    Nations are politically heterogeneous and which group is in political ascendency shapes the nature of interstate cooperation through two mechanisms. First, groups differ in the benefits they receive from cooperation. This affects which groups can commit to cooperate. Second, a nation may selectively withhold cooperation from one group to influence the domestic political competition between groups in another nation. By integrating political competition between leaders of different groups under different institutional rules into a prisoner's dilemma model of international cooperation, the theory generates hypotheses relating leader turnover, group membership, and patterns of cooperation.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)853-877
    Number of pages25
    JournalJournal of Conflict Resolution
    Volume53
    Issue number6
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Nov 27 2009

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    Keywords

    • Cooperation
    • Domestic political institutions
    • Infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma
    • Leadership
    • Political groups

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Business, Management and Accounting(all)
    • Sociology and Political Science
    • Political Science and International Relations

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