Political groups, leader change, and the pattern of international cooperation

Alastair Smith

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


    Nations are politically heterogeneous and which group is in political ascendency shapes the nature of interstate cooperation through two mechanisms. First, groups differ in the benefits they receive from cooperation. This affects which groups can commit to cooperate. Second, a nation may selectively withhold cooperation from one group to influence the domestic political competition between groups in another nation. By integrating political competition between leaders of different groups under different institutional rules into a prisoner's dilemma model of international cooperation, the theory generates hypotheses relating leader turnover, group membership, and patterns of cooperation.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)853-877
    Number of pages25
    JournalJournal of Conflict Resolution
    Issue number6
    StatePublished - 2009


    • Cooperation
    • Domestic political institutions
    • Infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma
    • Leadership
    • Political groups

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • General Business, Management and Accounting
    • Sociology and Political Science
    • Political Science and International Relations


    Dive into the research topics of 'Political groups, leader change, and the pattern of international cooperation'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

    Cite this