POLITICAL SOLUTIONS TO THE COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEM

MICHAEL LAVER

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    Abstract

    Abstract This paper juxtaposes two important political solutions to the collective action problem in the context of a common set of core assumptions. Once the core assumptions have been discussed, the distinction between the consumption and the production problems associated with public goods provision is elaborated. These assumptions and this distinction are applied to a comparison between a theory of individualistic anarchy, and a theory of competitive political entrepreneurs. Revisions of both are required to enable them to be placed within this framework. While the two theories are neither exclusive nor exhaustive they can, between them, be used to understand public goods provision in a number of different circumstances.

    Original languageEnglish (US)
    Pages (from-to)195-209
    Number of pages15
    JournalPolitical Studies
    Volume28
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    StatePublished - Jun 1980

    ASJC Scopus subject areas

    • Sociology and Political Science

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